Introduction
The oil price spike of over US$100/barrel in 2011 is an unkind reminder of the worldwide dependence on oil, much of which comes from the politically unstable Middle
East. Global warming and pollution due to fossil fuel consumption and environmental damages of fossil fuel extraction (e.g., deep-sea drilling, oil sand hydro-processing and shale-gas fracking) lend support to the development of renewable energy resources (e.g., wind and solar) that do not have emissions and severe environmental impacts. Caused by a 9.0 earthquake and the ensuing tsunami, the nuclear plant failures of 2011 along Japan's east coast further heighten the need for renewable energy resources that are preferably widely dispersed over a large geographic region. And nowhere in the states has the response been more proactive than in Texas, which despite its wealth of oil and natural gas has led the way in the development of wind generation. Indeed, although wind generators account for perhaps 2% of electric power in the United States, about 25% of that power is housed in Texas. The state's growth of wind generation will continue, accommodated by a US$4.9 billion transmission construction initiative designed to better interconnect competitive renewable energy zones (CREZ) to the state's major load centers.
1
The goal of this paper is to explore the effect of rising wind generation on the expected payoff of a tolling agreement for natural-gas-fired generation in Texas. Such an agreement is attractive to a generation owner because it provides stable known cash inflow, critical for the owner to obtain financing at relatively low costs (Stern, 1998) .
After making an upfront lease payment to a generator, the agreement's buyer, assumed to be a local distribution company (LDC) or a retail electric provider (REP) that serves retail loads, gains the right, but not the obligation, to use the generator's capacity when it is less costly than buying from the wholesale spot electricity market (Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Deng and Xia, 2006) . 2 Since the buyer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) tracks the agreement's expected payoff, our exploration sheds light on how rising wind generation reduces the generator's lease revenue, which in turn diminishes the incentive to invest in natural-gas-fired generation.
Our exploration is motivated by two transforming events taking place over the past two decades in the electricity industry. The first event is restructuring designed to introduce wholesale-market competition in Australia, New Zealand, parts of North and South America, and Europe (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 2006; Woo et al., 2006) . The second event is the large-scale development of wind generation due to its abundance (Hoogwijk et al., 2004; Lu et al., 2009 ) and government policies in North America and Europe (Haas et al., 2008; Schmalensee, 2009; Pollitt, 2010; Woo et al., 2011a; Alagappan et al., 2011) .
Related to the first event is the empirical fact that wholesale electricity spotmarket prices are inherently volatile, thanks to: daily fuel-cost variations, especially for the natural gas now widely used in combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) and combustion turbines (CT); weather-dependent seasonal demands with intra-day and inter-day fluctuations that must be met in real time by generation and transmission already in place;
limited economic viability of energy storage systems; changes in available capacity caused by planned and forced outages of electrical facilities; precipitation and river flow 2 In areas of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market that have been opened to retail competition, retail electric providers or "REPs" compete to make retail sales to energy consumers. In areas of this market not open to customer choice, municipal utilities or rural electric cooperatives sell electricity at the retail level.
for a system with significant hydro resources; carbon price fluctuations that affect thermal generation that uses fossil fuels; transmission constraints that cause transmission congestion and generation redispatch; lumpy capacity additions that can only occur with a long lead time (Li and Flynn, 2006; Bunn and Fezzi, 2007; Woo et al., 1998 Woo et al., , 2007 Tishler et al., 2008; Newcomer et al., 2008; Milstein and Tishler, 2011) .
The price volatility, accompanied by occasional sharp spikes, has encouraged extensive research on two related areas of electricity finance. 3 The first area encompasses the data-generation process (DGP) of electricity spot prices, 4 as well as locational price spreads and electricity trading gains. 5 The second area is the pricing of electricity derivatives, such as forward contracts 6 and capacity options, 7 which are useful for electricity risk management (Kleindorfer and Li, 2005; Deng and Oren, 2006; Huisman et al., 2009 ).
The second event is the large-scale development of wind generation. Since wind generation has zero fuel cost, it is economically dispatched to displace high-fuel-cost marginal generation (EWEA, 2010) , unless curtailed to resolve grid congestion and instability (Kumar et al., 2005) . Hence, rising wind generation tends to reduce wholesale spot electricity prices (Sensfuß et al., 2008; Trotsher and Korpas, 2008; Nicholson et al., 2010; Woo et al., 2011b) , diminishing the incentive for generation investment (Steggals et al., 2011; Traber and Kemfert, 2011) .
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The incentive to invest in a generation unit can be measured by the expected payoff of a tolling agreement, with the payoff being the positive difference between the wholesale spot electricity price and the unit's per MWH fuel cost. When rising wind generation suppresses the wholesale spot electricity price, it also suppresses the tolling agreement's expected payoff for the generation unit.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we introduce a regressionbased approach to valuate a tolling agreement. It differs from an option pricing formula based on an assumed DGP (e.g., Brownian motion) (Deng et al., 2001; Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003) . It uses market data to directly estimate the agreement's payoffs, without first modeling spot price behavior as done by Burger et al. (2004) , Deng and Xia (2006) and Trabert and Kemfert (2011) .
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Second, we find that while a 20% increase in wind generation in Texas may not have a statistically-significant effect, a 40% increase can reduce the tolling agreement's expected payoff by 8% to 13%. Even though our 8% to 13% estimates are based on an econometric analysis of historical data for Texas, they corroborate the 12% to 33%
estimates based on market simulation for the 100% increase in wind generation in 8 When wind generation capacity becomes a very large portion of a grid's total installed generation (e.g., Demark, Germany and Spain), this price reduction effect may not prevail because of the loss in the grid's flexibility to integrate wind generation (Pérez-Arriaga, 2011) . Investigating market price behavior via simulation for a future scenario of very high wind generation is an area that has attracted recent research attention (e.g., Troy et al., 2010) . Such an investigation, however, is well beyond the scope of the current paper. 9 As noted by an insightful referee, our empirical results are based on Texas-specific historical data. A substantial increase in wind generation development could exhaust the state's flexibility in integrating wind-generation output and exacerbate its transmission congestion. This could be a structural change unseen in the historical data, causing concerns over our results' usefulness and relevance. Such concerns, however, are tempered by the large amount of natural-gas generation in Texas and on-going transmission expansion to accommodate wind generation (Alagappan et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2011c; Zarnikau, 2011) .
Germany (Trabert and Kamfert, 2011, Table 5 , bottom rows RW and AW). Hence, both sets of estimates offer similar insight into the policy debate on capacity adequacy and system reliability. Since natural-gas-fired generation is necessary for integrating intermittent wind energy into an electric grid (Parson et al., 2009; Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010) , our findings contribute to the policy debate of capacity adequacy and system reliability in a restructured electricity market that will see large-scale windgeneration development (Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004; Roques et al., 2005; Newberry, 2010; Milstein and Tishler, 2011) . This database has five distinct features that help us to determine the effects of wind generation on the payoffs of a tolling agreement (Sioshansi and Hurlbut, 2010; Zarnikau, 2011 Table 2 reports the 15-minute payoffs of a tolling agreement by zonal market and heat rate (HR in MMBTU/MWH), which is the natural-gas-to-electricity conversion ratio.
Assuming a zero operation and maintenance (O&M) cost, a 15-minute payoff is given by max(15-minute spot-market price -HR x Houston Ship Channel natural-gas price, 0). The payoffs in Table 2 assume two real-world heat rates: (a) HR = 7 MMBTU/MWH which approximates the heat rate of a CCGT; and (b) HR = 9 MMBTU/MWH which approximates the heat rate of a CT (CEC, 2010; EIA, 2010) .
Panel A of Table 2 shows that for the full sample, the average payoffs are about $11/MWH at HR = 7 MMBUT/MWH and $7/MWH at HR = 9 MMBUT/MWH for the North and West zones, which are lower than the corresponding averages of about $14/MWH and $10/MWH for the Houston and South zones. The correlations between zonal payoffs and wind generation are weak, between -0.027 to -0.106, presaging the challenge in our identification and estimation of wind generation's effect on payoffs.
The weak correlation between payoffs and wind generation stems in part from the many zero payoffs in the full sample. Panel B of Table 2 shows that a tolling agreement with HR = 7 MMBTU/MWH is "in-the-money" with strictly positive payoffs about half the time. When the HR is 9 MMBTU/MWH, the agreement is "in-the-money" only a quarter of the time.
Panel B also reports mean values of strictly positive payoffs (e.g., $38.34/MWH for Houston at HR = 9) that are several times the median values (e.g., $6.72/MWH for Houston at HR = 9). Thus, the distributions of these payoffs are highly skewed with long right tails, as further confirmed by their 75-percentile, 95-percentile and maximum values.
Model

A tolling agreement's payoffs
Since the generator plant's variable O&M cost is small when compared to the electricity spot-market price, we assume zero variable O&M cost, implying that the plant's, or equivalently the agreement's, per MWH payoff in any 15-minute interval
, denoted Y td , may be written as:
where P td is the spot price ($/MWH) in interval t on day d, HR is the contracted heat rate, and G d is the natural-gas spot price ($/MMBTU) on day d. It may be seen as the payoff of an European spark-spread call option that expires in time interval t on day d.
The specification of the DGP for our sample of 15-minute payoffs is guided by four empirical facts. First, as Table 2 shows, over half of the sample time periods have zero payoffs at HR = 7 MMBTU/MWH and about three quarters have zero payoffs at HR = 9 MMBTU/MWH. The presence of many zero values precludes applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to the entire sample in order to fit a regression that reveals the marginal effect of wind generation on the profitability of a tolling agreement, because the estimate of the marginal effect will be biased (Maddala, 1983) .
Second, Table 2 shows that the distribution of strictly positive payoffs within any zonal market is skewed with a long right-hand tail. Thus, a log-linear specification is better suited for modeling the size of these payoffs than a linear specification.
Third, a random factor such as, equipment failure, which affects whether a strictly positive payoff would occur, can be expected to influence the size of the payoff.
Finally, zonal-market spot prices in the ERCOT zones have been found to move with a set of seven fundamental factors (Woo et al., 2011) , notably: X 1 , which measures the 15-minute wind generation; X 2 , which measures the 15-minute nuclear generation; X 3 , which measures the daily natural-gas price at the Henry Hub; and X 4 through X 7 , which respectively measure the 15-minute loads of the Houston, North, South and West zonal markets.
For notational simplicity, we suppress the time subscripts t and d when specifying the DGP for the 15-minute payoffs:
In equation (2), B =  0 +  1 lnX 1 + ... +  7 ln X 7 ,  = white noise, A =  0 +  1 X 1 + ... +  7 X 7 , and  = logistically distributed random-error term. To allow for the residual timedependence of Y, the intercepts of  0 for B and  0 for A are assumed to be linear functions of binary indicators for hour-of-day, day-of-week, and month-of-year effects.
Useful for analyzing a data sample with many zero values for the dependent variable (e.g., outage cost estimation in Munasinghe et al. (1988) ), equation (2) generalizes the standard Tobit model, allowing the drivers (X 1 , ..., X 7 ) to have different impacts on whether a strictly positive payoff would occur, than on the size of the payoff.
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We estimate the coefficients in two stages.
Stage 1: Apply the maximum likelihood method to the full sample to estimate the following binary logit model: 10 We applied the maximum likelihood method to the full sample of about 116,000 observations to estimate a standard Tobit model for each zonal market. The model, however, failed to converge after 500 iterations.
Stage 2: Apply the OLS method to the subsample of strictly positive payoffs to estimate the following log-linear regression:
In equation (4), the white noise  in equation (2) has been decomposed into its conditional mean C and a heteroskedastic disturbance term . Intended to correct sample-selection bias, the term C is [(1 -S) ln(1 -S)/S + lnS], a negative number whose size increases in S (Dubin and McFadden, 1984) . If  < 0, it can be inferred that an unobserved random factor that increases the probability of a strictly positive payoff will tend to enlarge the size of the payoff.
Testable hypotheses
To help interpret our regression results, we formulate a set of hypotheses that can be tested via the coefficient estimates. These hypotheses reflect our expectations as to the effects of each driver on the spot-market price and the cost of burning natural gas to produce electricity.
Probability of strictly positive payoffs
We hypothesize that rising wind generation will tend to reduce spot-market prices and therefore the probability of a strictly positive payoff. This translates into our first hypothesis:  1 < 0.
We do not use the 15-minute data on dispatchable generation (i.e., hydro, coal, and natural gas), because they are endogenous as a result of ERCOT's least-cost dispatch decisions (ERCOT, 2004) . Nuclear generation is baseload and non-dispatchable.
Reducing nuclear output due to maintenance, repair or refuel is expected to raise the market price and therefore the probability of a strictly positive payoff. This translates into our second hypothesis:  2 < 0.
Because of a vast thermal-generation fleet in Texas, we use the exogenous Henry
Hub price, which is almost perfectly correlated with the Houston Ship Channel price (R = 0.99), to quantify what we hypothesize to be the positive price effect of the marginal fuel (natural gas) on the electricity spot-market price. An increase in the natural-gas price, however, also raises the cost of the natural gas used to generate electricity. Hence, our third hypothesis is:  3 < 0. This hypothesis reflects our conjecture that the cost effect, on average, dominates the price effect.
Finally, we postulate that rising loads will tend to raise market prices and therefore the probability of a strictly positive payoff. Hence, our fourth through seventh hypotheses are:  4 , ...,  7 > 0.
Size of a strictly positive payoff
As rising wind generation reduces the market price and therefore the size of a strictly positive payoff, our eighth hypothesis is:  1 < 0.
Since reducing nuclear output is expected to raise the electricity spot-market price and therefore the size of a strictly positive payoff, our ninth hypothesis is:  2 < 0.
An increase in the natural-gas price raises both the spot price and the cost of natural gas. Conditional on the tolling agreement already being in the money for the particular 15-minute interval, we conjecture that the price effect dominates the cost effect. Hence, our tenth hypothesis is:  3 > 0.
As rising loads tend to raise spot-market prices and therefore the size of any strictly positive payoffs, our next four hypotheses are:  4 , ...,  7 > 0.
Our 15 th and final hypothesis is  < 0, reflecting our intuition that an unobserved random factor that increases the probability of a strictly positive payoff also tends to magnify the size of the payoff. with a test of whether a 10% (40%) increase in wind generation has a statisticallysignificant effect on the payoffs.

Step 6: The coefficient estimates of the logit regression are applied to each 15-minute observation in the full sample to estimate that observation's probability of a strictly positive payoff for a given  value.
Step 7: The data are now available to allow us to estimate the unconditional payoff for each observation in the full sample. This is done by multiplying the estimated probability of a positive profit from Step 6 by the estimated positive profit for that observation based upon the scaled wind-generation level, and then multiplying this product by the adjustment factor from Step 4.
Step 8: In the final step, we compute the average difference between the estimated and the actual payoffs for each observation in the full sample.
The results from
Step 8 allow us to estimate the effects of rising wind generation on the profitability of a tolling agreement. When the average difference at  = 1.0 is not statistically significant, say at the α = 0.01 level of statistical significance, which is the standard to which we adhere throughout the paper, our simulation process is said to be unbiased and useful for computing the effects of rising wind generation. When the average difference at  = 1.1 is not statistically significant, we may infer that a 10% increase in wind generation does not have a statistically-significant impact on the agreement's payoffs. Finally, if the average difference at  = 1.4 is statistically significant, a 40% increase in wind generation can be said to have a statisticallysignificant impact on the payoffs to a tolling agreement. MMBTU/MWH, respectively. The estimates for the binary hourly, daily, and monthly indicators, which vary in both sign and statistical significance, are not reported, as they are too numerous and are only included in the regressions to reflect and account for any residual time-dependence. As one would expect, the percentage of strictly positive payoffs in the estimation sample is much larger, here about twice as large, for the lower heat rate. In that case, too, the fit to the data is somewhat better, with R 2 s in the neighborhood of 0.42 as opposed to 0.36.
Results
Binary logit estimates
The statistically-significant estimates for parameters α 1 through α 3 support our first three hypotheses for all four zonal markets: notably, regardless of the agreement's heat rate, the probability of a positive payoff is reduced by (1) increased wind or (2) nuclear generation, and (3) increases in the price of natural gas. When statistically significant, the estimates for parameters α 4 through α 7 are all positive, supporting our hypotheses that rising zonal loads tend to improve the probability of strictly positive payoffs.
In the overwhelming main, then, the binary logit results are intuitively plausible and support our hypotheses.
OLS estimates
Using the same basic two-panel format as in Table 3 , the estimates for the OLS regression of equation (3), by zonal market and with the parameter estimates for the timedependent indicators not reported, are presented in Table 4 .
With two minor exceptions, both related to the direction of the correction bias,
hypotheses (8) through (14) are supported for CCGT generation with HR = 7 MMBTU/MWH. That is, strictly positive payoffs will decrease in response to (8) increases in wind or (9) nuclear generation, and will increase in response to (10) increases in the natural-gas price wherein the price effect of the increase dominates the cost effect, or increased zonal loads in (11) Houston, (12) the North, (13) the South, or (14) the West.
Although the first three parameter estimates for θ have the hypothesized negative sign -or (15) a randomly-induced increase in the probability of a positive payoff will tend to magnify its size -the hypothesis receives statistically-significant support only in the Houston and South zonal markets.
The estimate for θ in the West zone is 0.0341 and statistically significant (p = 0.0064). While small in size, this positive estimate would suggest that when an unobserved random factor reduces the likelihood of a strictly positive payoff in the West zone, it also tends to reduce the size of that payoff, which is the only counter-intuitive result from our regression analysis of a large and noisy database.
As equation (3) is a double-log specification, the parameter estimates may be interpreted as elasticities. Thus, for example, the first of the estimates in Table 3 The OLS results for CT generation and HR = 9, as reported in Panel B of Table 4 , are generally supportive of our hypotheses. The statistically-significant estimates for  1 and  2 support hypotheses (8) and (9) of the negative impact on a positive payoff of an increase in either wind or nuclear generation. As to hypothesis (10) -the price effect of an increase in the natural-gas price dominates the cost effect -both estimated coefficients with the hypothesized positive sign, for the Houston and South zonal markets, are statistically insignificant, while the two statistically-significant estimates, for the North and West markets, have signs that would disconfirm the hypothesis. There is, however, a rather straight-forward explanation: at the higher heat rate of 9 MMBTU/MWH the cost effect of an increase in the natural-gas price tends to overcome the price effect.
Fourteen of the 16 positive-payoff elasticities with respect to zonal loads are statistically significant and have the hypothesized signs, in support of hypotheses (11) through (14). The two exceptions are for the South zonal load and neither exception lends statistically-significant support to contradict the hypothesis. By contrast with the estimates for the lower heat rate, however, and particularly for the Houston and West zonal loads, the positive payoffs in all four zonal markets are highly elastic with respect to the loads. That is, if a tolling agreement is not going to be profitable, it will really be unprofitable with a high-heat-rate CT generator and when the Houston or West zones have low loads.
Finally, in support of our bias-correction hypothesis (15), all four estimates of θ are negatively signed and statistically significant.
Effect of rising wind generation on a tolling agreement's payoffs
We undertook this research in order to explore the valuation of a tolling agreement in the presence of increased wind generation. Based upon the parameter estimates presented in the Tables 3 and 4 , the estimated payoffs as presented in Panels A through D of Table 5 , are computed through our eight-step simulation process. Each panel shows the average payoff, for that zonal market, for no change in wind generation,  = 1.0, through a 40% increase in wind generation,  = 1.4.
Absent an increase in wind generation, there should be no change to a tolling agreement's payoffs. This is borne out by the statistically-insignificant estimates in the row labeled  = 1.0, in the average-payoff column, in each of the four panels, which supports the notion that our estimation process is unbiased.
When  = 1.1, the payoff difference of a tolling agreement that is estimated to occur due to rising wind generation is statistically insignificant; or, a 10% increase in In sum, Table 5 indicates that a 40% increase in wind generation would reduce payoffs by 8% to 13%, as shown in the bottom rows of Panels A-D. Unless an owner of natural-gas-fired generation could receive compensation elsewhere, the decline in the LDC's WTP could be a serious disincentive for investment in thermal generation.
Conclusion
With some 36 GW of installed capacity, or a little more than 20% of the world's total, the United States is at the forefront of wind generation, with second-place China rapidly closing a very narrow gap and the United Kingdom in eighth place at approximately the same level as Texas. Indeed, for several years "wind power has been the fastest-growing source of new electric power generation" in the states (EIA, 2011, p.
2). Even though new installations have recently declined, wind generators still account for 16% of all planned capacity additions for the five-year period from 2010 to 2014.
Rising wind generation can benefit electricity consumers by reducing wholesale market prices, but it can also discourage natural-gas-fired generation investment, as we have demonstrated using the ERCOT 15-minute database. Even though CCGT and CT are required to integrate large amounts of intermittent wind energy into an electricity grid, there may not be sufficient investment in CCGT and CT to maintain system reliability.
Besides Texas, there are other restructured markets (e.g., Germany, Denmark, Spain, UK, Ontario, and California) that have or will have significant wind-generation development (Alagappan et al., 2011; Yatchew and Baziliauskas, 2011) . Our finding of vanishing investment incentives for natural-gas-fired generation corroborates that of Traber and Kemfert (2011) for Germany and Steggals et al. (2011) for UK. Hence, the policy debate over market design and generation investment incentives should account for the large-scale wind generation that will occur in a restructured market (Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004; Roques et al., 2005; Newberry, 2010; Milstein and Tishler, 2011) .
In closing, we acknowledge three important changes in ERCOT that will command future attention by researchers studying the relationship between large-scale wind-generation development and the investment incentive for conventional generation.
First, ERCOT will likely see more wind-generation expansion, beyond the 40% assumed here. Infrastructure upgrades are underway to accommodate the transmission of over 18 GW of wind generation. 11 Hence, ERCOT's future wholesale spot-market price behavior and dynamics may differ from that in the past. Second, as of December 2010 ERCOT switched from zonal to nodal pricing. Even though ERCOT continues to have zonal prices for bill settlement of zonal loads, such zonal prices may behave differently from those in the past. Lastly, ERCOT continues to build new transmission to interconnect its CREZ. It is difficult to accurately predict at the present time how the new transmission will impact ERCOT's wholesale spot electricity prices in the future. Notwithstanding these changes, our econometric approach remains valid as it is equally applicable to model the impact of rising wind generation on the investment incentive for natural-gasfired generation, using the zonal-price data that will be forthcoming over the next two to three years. Note: For brevity, this table does not report the coefficient estimates for the intercept and the binary indicators to capture the hour-of-day, day-of-week and month-of-year effects, even though these estimates indicate the probability's statistically-significant time-
], where L 0 = log-likelihood with intercept only, L 1 = log-likelihood of the estimated model, and N = sample size (Cox and Snell, 1989, pp.208-209) . Table 4 : OLS log-linear regressions for the natural logarithm of the size of the payoff of a spark-spread call option. Values in ( ) are standard errors of the coefficient estimates based on the consistent covariance matrix (White, 1980) and "*" denotes significance at α = 0.01. Table 3 due to missing values for the metric variables. For brevity, this table does not report the coefficient estimates for the intercept and binary indicators that capture the hour-of-day, day-of-week and month-of-year effects, even though these estimates indicate statistically-significant time-dependence of the natural logarithm of payoff size (α = 0.01). 
